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THE REFINEMENT OF THE WARSAW SYSTEM: WHY THE 1999
MONTREAL CONVENTION REPRESENTS THE BEST HOPE FOR
UNIFORMITY
Jennifer McKay*
INTRODUCTION
The airline liability regime known as the "Warsaw System" has
governed international air travel since the early days of the industry. The
Warsaw System includes the original Warsaw Convention of 1929, along
with several other protocols and agreements amending it. Over 135
countries currently adhere to the Warsaw Convention or one of its revised
forms.' One of the primary goals of the Warsaw Convention is to create
uniformity in the rules governing international carriage by air.2 However,
mounting evidence demonstrates that the scheme set out by the Warsaw
Convention has been largely unsuccessful in meeting this goal. It remains
unclear whether true uniformity is actually realistic with so many countries
involved. Resolving the inconsistencies between the many agreements in
the Warsaw System will create a greater degree of uniformity in the
application of the rules governing international air transport. This Note
argues that signatories to the Convention should adopt the 1999 Montreal
Convention, the most recent attempt at unifying all previous Warsaw
treaties and agreements.
* B.A., Smith College, 1996; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 2002. I owe
many heartfelt thanks to Professor Hiram Chodosh for all of his wisdom and guidance;
Shannon Krasnokutski and Nicole Braden for their advice; Heather McKay for her
unconditional love and support; Mom and Dad for the title; and, finally, to Oscar and Amy
for not eating my research.
Multilateral Convention for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 106-45, at 15-16 (hereinafter "Montreal Convention")(letter of submittal by Sen.
Strobe Talbott).
2 See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 5 (1988); see also Bernard Wood, Yet Another Look at the Warsaw Convention,
in AIR AND SPACE LAW 149 (Tanja L. Masson-Zwaan et al. eds., 1992), Naneen K. Baden,
Comment, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 J. AIR. L. & COM. 437,
438 (1996). But cf Ian D. Midgley, Note, You'll Love the Way We Fly - But If You Don't,
Too Bad: Does Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Offer Hope of Subjecting Reckless
International Airlines to Punitive Damages? 48 CASE W. RES. 73, 106-20 (1997) (Midgley
argues that, contrary to the beliefs of most court and commentators, the drafters of the
original Warsaw Convention did not actually intend to create substantive uniformity,-
thereby promoting the notion that punitive damages can and should be allowed under the
Warsaw Convention.).
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Section II of this Note reviews the history of the Warsaw System,
pointing out how liability rules evolved through amended versions of the
Warsaw Convention. Section Hm presents several inconsistencies within the
Warsaw System, and the reasons for the lack of uniformity in the
application of key provisions. Section IV identifies the consequences of
disuniformity within the Convention. Finally, Section V evaluates the
potential impact of the proposed revisions to the Convention and argues
that the 1999 Montreal Convention, the newest set of rules, will ultimately
foster the goal of uniformity.
I. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW SYSTEM
The Warsaw System is a "patchwork of liability regimes."3 People
commonly refer to "the Warsaw Convention" without realizing there are
actually several amendments and agreements that make up this complex
system of rules. Since the introduction of the original Convention in 1929,
member countries and private airlines have made repeated attempts to
revise various provisions, particularly with respect to liability. The result is
a tangled network of at least ten different agreements and protocols. Some
of these documents' provisions overlap, while other provisions conflict with
each other. Several countries belong to vastly different regimes within the
system, causing unpredictability and many contradictions. Before
exploring these inconsistencies, it is first necessary to become familiar with
the key provisions of the main documents that comprise the Warsaw
System.
A. Formation and Contents of the Warsaw Convention of
1929
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air (hereinafter "Warsaw Convention" or
"Convention") applies to all international air travel, as well as international
transportation of goods.4 This multilateral treaty was introduced in October
1929 at an international aviation conference in Warsaw, Poland,5 and
entered into force in 1933.6 The reason for the conference was the need to
"foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation industry."7
3 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at 16.
4 49 Stat. 3000, found at 49 U.S.C.S. § 40105 (United States Translation) [hereinafter
"Warsaw Convention"]. See also GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 199.
5 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 3. See also Randi Lynne Rubin, The Warsaw
Convention: Capping the Value of Life?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 189, 190 (1998).
6 See Midgley, supra note 2, at 78.
7 Baden, supra note 2, at 438 (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,
546 (1991)).
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The delegates to the Warsaw Conference decided to protect the new
international industry in two ways. First, the delegates created uniformity
in the rules governing such issues as ticketing, transport of baggage and
cargo, and some of the procedures surrounding passenger claims resulting
from international flights.8 Second, the drafters capped the amount of air
carriers' liability in accidents, while also limiting the defenses available to
the airlines. 9 The United States did not participate in either the negotiation
or the drafting of the Convention but ratified the treaty in 1934.0
The Warsaw Convention contains 41 Articles. Certain Articles have
figured more prominently than others in cases brought under the
Convention. The Articles that have generated the most controversy and
discussion deserve special focus.
1. Article 1: International Transportation
Article 1 defines "international transportation" to mean any flight in
which both the point of departure and the destination are either within two
High Contracting Parties to the Convention, or within one High Contracting
Party if there is an "agreed stopping place" within another country (whether
or not a Party to the Convention).' Air travel between a High Contracting
Party and a country that is not a High Contracting Party is not
"international" for purposes of the Convention. In addition, a flight from a
High Contracting Party to one of its territories or possessions is not
considered international, even when the route takes the airplane over
another country or the high seas. For example, a flight from New York to
a See Federico Ortino and Gideon R.E. Jurgens, The JATA Agreements and the
European Regulation: The Latest Attempts in the Pursuit of a Fair and Uniform Liability
Regime for International Air Transportation, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 377, 381 (1999). See also
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 5 ("The Convention seeks to... unify laws in treaty countries
and establish uniformity of documents...").
9 Rubin, supra note 5, at 193. See also GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 5 ("The
Convention seeks to limit international air carriers' potential liability in case of accidents
[and] facilitate recovery by passengers ... by creating a presumption of liability for
accidents and limit[ing] passengers' recovery for injuries caused by such accidents during
transportation covered by the Convention.").
10 Howard Sokol, Comment, Final Boarding Call - The Warsaw Convention's
Exclusivity and Preemption of State Law Claims in International Air Travel: El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 74 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 227, 228 (Winter 2000). The U.S. declined to
participate in the conference leading to the Warsaw Convention for three reasons: 1) It was a
conflict of U.S. public policy to limit liability in cases of negligence; 2) The U.S. did not
directly subsidize its airlines; and 3) Pan Am was the only U.S. air carrier which flew
internationally, so the goals of the Convention were not as immediately necessary. Rubin,
supra note 5, at 194-95.
1 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4. "A High Contracting Party is a country that has
ratified the Convention and not merely signed it..." GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 10.
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Puerto Rico, or from Paris to Guadeloupe would not be "international" and
the Convention would not apply.'
2
Article 1 also provides that "carriage to be performed by several
successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of [the] Convention, to
be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single
operation ....",1 A flight will still be considered "international" if portions
of the flight are solely within the same country.' 4 For example, if "Frank"
flies from Country A to Country B (both High Contracting Parties), the
Warsaw Convention covers his flight to Country B and his successive flight
within that country. Therefore, if he flies from Country A into an airport at
one city in Country B, and then boards another flight to continue on to his
final destination at a different city in Country B, both flights are considered
"international" for purposes of the Convention.
This distinction becomes particularly important with regard to the
latter flight. If "Joe" boards the flight between two cities within Country B,
a purely "intra-national" journey, he would be considered a domestic
passenger. This means that if Joe is on the same flight within Country B as
Frank, the flight would be "international" for Frank, while simultaneously
"domestic" for Joe. The terms of the Warsaw Convention would govern a
claim for damages by Frank for injuries sustained on that flight. Joe, on the
other hand, would not be covered by the Convention for injuries arising out
of the same flight. Instead, Joe would resort to local law. The possibility
exists that Joe, as a domestic passenger unhindered by the liability caps in
the Convention, could recover a great deal more in damages than Frank, the
international passenger.
A domestic passenger also may have a greater variety of claims to
pursue. The Warsaw Convention has often been interpreted as a bar to
recovery of punitive damages 5 and recovery for purely mental injuries.1 6 It
is important to note that the United States Supreme Court, as well as courts
of other nations, has held that the Warsaw Convention provides the
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained on international flights, and that the
12 See GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 14-15.
13 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
14 See id.
15 See generally Midgley, supra note 2. See also In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark.,
118 F.Supp.2d 916, 921 (E.O. Ark. 2000). In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1984,
932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
16 See generally Max Chester, Comment, The Aftermath of the Airplane Accident:
Recovery of Damages for Psychological Injuries Accompanied by Physical Injuries Under
the Warsaw Convention, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 227 (Fall 2000). See also In re Air Crash at
Little Rock, Ark., 118 F.Supp.2d 916, 921 (E.O. Ark. 2000). South Pacific Air Motive Pty.
Ltd. v. Magnus, 157 ALR 443 (Fed. Ct. Austl., 1998).
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Convention pre-empts all other causes of action. 17 If, in the above example,
Country B's law allows claims for punitive damages and mental injuries,
Joe (the domestic passenger) could receive far more than the $8300 in
compensatory damages to which Frank, as an international passenger,
would be limited under the Convention.18
2. Articles 17, 18 and 19: Carrier's Liability
These three Articles are key in two respects: They define the liability
of the carrier for both injury and delay. 19 Article 17 states that the air
carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of death or bodily
injury of a passenger, if the accident takes place on the airplane, or while
boarding or disembarking.20 Article 18 provides that the carrier is liable for
checked baggage and goods that are damaged or lost while in the care of the
airline.21  Article 19 holds the carrier liable for damages caused by the
22delay of passengers, baggage or cargo.
Although these provisions seem straightforward, many courts have
struggled to interpret their meaning. The word "accident" in Article 17, for
example, draws a lot of attention. The definition is crucial because "[i]f an
incident occurs in international air transportation, it is not compensable
unless it is an 'accident."' 2 3 The United States Supreme Court defines
"accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger. '24 American courts have determined that the aggravationof a pre-existing medical condition does not fall under the definition of an
17 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. V. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 (1999) ("The treaty
precludes passengers from bringing actions under local law when they cannot establish air
carrier liability under the treaty."). Roberts v. Guyana Airways Corp., 41 O.R.3d 653 (Gen'l
Div. Ontario Ct., 1998). Sidhu v. British Airways PLC, I All E.R. 193 (U.K. House of
Lords, 1997), Seagate Technology Int'l v. Chang Int'l Airport Services Pty. Ltd., [1997] 3
SLR 1 (Singapore Ct. of App. May 27, 1997).
18 See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 118 F.Supp.2d at 921 ("[Tihere were both
domestic and international passengers injured when flight 1420 crashed. Passengers covered
by the Warsaw Convention are precluded from seeking punitive damages. Domestic
passengers are free to assert such a claim. This is true even though the domestic and
international passengers were all affected by the disaster." Id.). See discussion supra
Section II(A)(4) and accompanying notes regarding liability limits.
19 Air carrier liability has been called "the heart of the Convention." I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 66 (5 th ed. 1993).
20 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
21 id.
22 Id.
23 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 60.
24 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
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"accident" for purposes of claims under the Warsaw Convention.25 One
court held that a plane's hard landing was not an "accident" because the
landing was not an unexpected or unusual event, despite the fact that the
landing resulted in injury to the plaintiffs back.26 Courts in the United
States and France consider a terrorist attack an "accident, ' 27 but one court
in England concluded that a terrorist attack does not fall under this
definition.28
The accident must cause physical injury to be compensable; recovery
for mental distress unaccompanied by a bodily injury caused by the
accident is barred.29  Punitive damages are also not permitted under the
Warsaw Convention.30  This is due to courts' interpretation of the
expression "damage sustained" ("dommage survenu" in the French text) in
Article 17. This term is commonly held to cover compensatory damages
only.3'
3. Articles 20 and 21: Carrier's Defenses
Articles 20 and 21 provide the carrier with defenses to liability claims.
Article 20 allows a carrier to completely avoid liability if it proves it took
"all necessary measures" to avoid the accident, or it was impossible to do
so. 32 "All necessary measures" is generally interpreted to mean measures
"reasonably available to the carrier, and reasonably calculated to prevent
the loss. '33 Article 21 enables the carrier to reduce its liability based on the
contributory negligence of the injured passenger.34  The carrier has the
burden of proof for both of these defenses.35
25 Baden, supra note 2, at 449-50 (citing Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130
(3rd Cir. 1984), and Walker v. Eastern Air Lines, 785 F. Supp. 1168 (SDNY 1992)).
26 See GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 60 (citing Salce v. Aerlingus, 19 Avi. 17377 (Dist.
Ct. N.Y. 1985)).
27 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 405, Ayache v. Air France, 38 Rev. franc. dr.
aerien 450, 451 (T.G.I. Paris, Is t ch. 1984).
28 See Sidhu v. British Airways, 1 All E.R. 193 (British House of Lords 1997).
29 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
30 See supra note 15.
31 See, e.g., South Pacific Air Motive Pty. Ltd. v. Magnus, 157 ALR 443, 447-449 (Fed.
Ct. Austl., 1998).
32 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
33 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 87.
34 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
35 See GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 89-92.
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4. Article 22: Liability Limit
Article 22 is one of the most important and controversial in the
Warsaw Convention. This section caps the air carrier's liability for
passenger injury or death at 125,000 francs (approximately $8300)36 in
actions falling under the Convention.37 Many countries find this figure
unacceptably low, particularly when domestic plaintiffs may recover
millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages from the same
accident in which an international passenger is limited to no more than
$8300.38 One early example of the inequity caused by this limit is found in
Ross v. Pan American Airways.39 An American who was seriously injured
in a 1943 crash in Portugal was limited to a recovery of only $8300, despite
enormous medical bills and grave injuries, because of the liability limits of
the Warsaw Convention.
40
A clause in paragraph One of the Article provides a method by which
carriers may agree to a higher limit, however.4 This provision is the basis
for several later private agreements among carriers requiring higher liability
limits, and even waiving them altogether in some cases. A carrier may not,
however, contract for limits lower than those set out in Article 22.42
5. Article 25: Willful Misconduct
Article 25 strips the carrier of the Warsaw Convention's defenses if the
damage was caused by the carrier's "willful misconduct."43  More
importantly, a carrier shown to have caused an injury through willful
misconduct is not entitled to the liability limits that would otherwise
govern." This provision is difficult for plaintiffs to use successfully,
particularly in jurisdictions that define willful misconduct as an act done to
intentionally cause harm, since, as one commentator points out, "[it could
36 See Ortino and Jurgens, supra note 8, at 381.
37 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
38 See discussion supra pages 23-24 and accompanying notes regarding Japan, Italy and
Fiji.
39 85 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1949) (cited in Baden, supra note 2, at 452).
40 See id.
41 "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher
limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
42 Article 32 provides in part: "Any clause contained in the contract and all special
agreements entered into before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe
the rules laid down by this convention ... shall be null and void." Id.
43 Id.
44 id.
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prove extremely difficult to convince a jury that a pilot would intentionally
cause a crash since the pilot's own life would be at risk.,
45
6. Article 28: Fora Available to Plaintiff
Article 28 lists the four fora in which a plaintiff may bring an action
for damages: 1) the domicile of the carrier; 2) the principal place of the
carrier's business; 3) the country where the contract of travel was made, so
long as the carrier has a place of business there; or 4) the place of
destination.46 In addition, the Article makes clear that the chosen forum
must be within the territory of a High Contracting Party. 7 The lack of an
option for the plaintiff to bring suit in the country of his own domicile can
lead to an effective bar to recovery, particularly in situations where the only
fora permitted are in countries thousands of miles away.
A New York court, for example, dismissed a case in which a New
York resident paid for tickets at a New York travel agency and picked them
up in Delhi, India, for travel from Delhi to New York on a Romanian
airline.48 The tickets were for a round-trip from India to the U.S. in order to
save money on a future trip to India, according to the plaintiffs.49 The
plaintiffs were detained for six days by the carrier's employees at a stop-
over in Bucharest and allegedly deprived of adequate food and facilities.
Because the carrier's domicile and place of business were in Romania, the
face of the tickets showed the ultimate destination as India, and the tickets
were physically retrieved in India (becoming, in the court's view, the place
of business where the contract was made), the court ruled the U.S. was not
one of the four fora available under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.
Therefore, the plaintiffs could not sue in U.S. court. 51 In addition, since the
Warsaw Convention pre-empts all other causes of action, the plaintiff's
claim for damages for false imprisonment was dismissed as well.
A similar ruling was issued by the U.S. District Court in Houston,
Texas, in which the court dismissed a claim for damages arising out of the
death of a passenger in a crash.52 The passenger had purchased the ticket
through an agent in the U.S. for a flight on Continental Airlines from Texas
to Colombia, with a connection to the defendant air carrier for a flight to
Panama. The court held that, despite the fact that the ticket was purchased
45 Baden, supra note 2, at 452. See discussion supra page 25 of varying interpretations
of "willful misconduct."
46 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
47 id.
48 Singh v. Tarom Romanian Air Transport, 88 F.Supp.2d 62, 62-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
49 Id. at 63.
50 id.
51 See id. at 64-67.
52 Luna v. Compania Panamena De Aviacion, S.A., 851 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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for successive carriage through an agent in the U.S. (arguably a place of
business through which the contract was made),53 the defendant's contacts
with Texas were so minimal the court did not have jurisdiction.54
7. Article 29: Statute of Limitations
Article 29 sets forth a period of two years in which a plaintiff may
bring an action under the Convention. After this period, all rights to a claim
for damages are extinguished. There is some debate, however, as to how
exactly to calculate this period. Some courts have held the period is subject
to tolling in certain circumstances, while others have held the period is
strictly for two years, with no tolling allowed.55
B. The Hague Protocol of 1955
In response to international pressure to raise the liability limit
contained in the Warsaw Convention, an international conference
assembled at The Hague in 1955.56 The resulting treaty, the Hague
Protocol,57 contains various revisions of the Warsaw Convention, the most
notable being a doubling of the liability limit to 250,000 francs
(approximately $16,600)." In addition, the "willful misconduct" provision
of Article 2559 was changed to a standard requiring intentional or reckless
acts or omissions on the part of the carrier before a plaintiff can claim
unlimited liability.6°
Those countries that ratified the Hague Protocol automatically adopted
the original Warsaw Convention as well. 61 The United States signed the
Hague Protocol, but the treaty was never ratified by the Senate because of
continuing dissatisfaction with the low liability limits. 62 The United States
53 Cf American Airlines v. Court of Appeals [Philippines], G.R. No. 116044-45 (3d Div.
2000) (holding that defendant airline was acting as an agent of another airline whose ticket
plaintiff exchanged in Switzerland for a different ticket on a flight with defendant, and that
since the original ticket was purchased in the Philippines, the court had jurisdiction as the
country of the place of business where the contract was made).
54 Luna, 851 F.Supp. at 833-34.
55 See discussion supra Section IH(E) and accompanying notes.
56 Rubin, supra note 5, at 199.
57 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air [hereinafter "Hague Protocol"], reprinted in GOLDHIRSH, supra
note 2, at 265.
58 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at 4.
59 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 57.
61 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 6.
62 Rubin, supra note 5, at 201.
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continued to abide by the original, unamended Convention, while other
countries (including many that flew to and from the U.S.) adhered to the
Hague Protocol. This was a major step away from the uniformity sought by
the Convention. International flights are governed by the most recent
version of the Convention that both countries have ratified.63 In the case of
a flight between the U.S. and a signatory of the Hague Protocol, this means
the flight would fall under the terms of the original Convention, since that
would be the most recent one the U.S. ratified. Therefore, a passenger
injured on a flight from a Hague Protocol country to the U.S. would still be
limited to a recovery of $8300.
C. The Montreal Agreement of 1966
The United States, concerned about the low value placed on the lives
of Americans flying overseas (in contrast to the higher awards plaintiffs
receive in domestic air cases), continually pushed for higher liability limits
in the Warsaw Convention. By 1966, the U.S. finally grew tired of the low
liability limits and filed a denunciation, which would have allowed the
United States to withdraw completely from the Convention.
64
The international community feared that if such a powerful country
abandoned the Convention, most other member countries would quickly
follow suit. In response, the International Air Transport Association
("IATA")65 held a meeting in Montreal to persuade the U.S. to withdraw its
denunciation of the Convention.66 As a result of this meeting, the delegates
reached a new agreement that added certain new provisions designed to
placate the U.S.6  Under the 1966 Montreal Agreement, carriers agreed to
63 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 12. But see Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,
214 F.3d 301, 310-14 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the Warsaw Convention does not apply to
a dispute between an American plaintiff and a South Korean airline, since the U.S. ratified
the original Convention but not the Hague Protocol, whereas South Korea ratified the Hague
version of the Convention, rather than the original). This illustrates just one of the many
interpretive differences caused by the multiple liability regimes currently in existence. As
one commentator stated, "[I]t is not at all unusual for transport to take place between two
states, one of which has adhered to the Hague Protocol, whereas the other has only ratified
the Warsaw Convention: the application of the two Conventions may then cause
complications." DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 100.
64 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 7. Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention provides in part:
"Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a notification
addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland . . ." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 4.
65 For a description of the history and mission of the IATA, see generally JACQUES
NAVEAU, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A CHANGING WORLD 59 (1989).
66 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 7.
67 See Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18990 [hereinafter "Montreal Agreement"], reprinted in
GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 317.
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raise their liability limits to $75,00068 where passengers had tickets with the
United States as the point of departure, destination or as a planned stopping
place. These carriers also agreed to waive completely the Article 20
defense of having taken "all necessary measures" to avoid the accident.
69
The Montreal Agreement only covers flights into and out of the United
States, so carriers could potentially be bound by three different liability
regimes, depending on the destination.70 A carrier adhering to the Hague
Protocol ($16,600 limit) is bound by that protocol when flying to another
Hague Protocol country. The same carrier, if also a signatory to the
Montreal Agreement ($75,000 limit), is bound by that agreement when
flying to and from the United States. In addition, that very same carrier,
when flying to a country that signed only the original Warsaw Convention
($8300 limit), is bound on that particular flight only by the provisions of the
Convention. This inconsistency makes it increasingly difficult for
passengers to predict the air carrier's liability on any given flight. The
Warsaw System becomes more complicated with each new evolution.
D. The Montreal Protocols of 1975
In 1975, delegates from around the world again met in Montreal,
resulting in four new protocols amending the Warsaw Convention. The
most notable change was to replace the gold standard used in calculating
damage amounts with a new unit of currency: Special Drawing Rights
("SDR")7' The SDR was developed by the International Monetary Fund,
based on the currencies of France, Britain, Japan, Germany, and the United
States.72 Although the Montreal Protocols were signed immediately by
many countries, the United States did not sign the protocols until 1999.
Once again, with every country under a different liability regime,
predictability and uniformity became even more unattainable.
E. The Japanese Initiative of 1992
In response to domestic concerns about the low liability limits in the
Warsaw Convention, ten Japanese airlines decided to use the "special
contract" opt-out clause contained in Article 22(1) of the Convention. 73
The airlines agreed to unlimited liability in any claim of injury on
international flights under the Convention. In addition, the airlines
voluntarily restricted their access to any of the Convention's defenses in
68 See id.
69 See id. See also note 32 supra.
70 See Rubin, supra note 5, at 204.
71 See Additional Protocols No. 1-4 [hereinafter "Montreal Protocols"], reprinted in
GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 331.
72 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 97.
73 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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claims up to 100,000 SDRs (approximately $135,000). 74 This Initiative
applied only to Japanese air carriers. The international community
regarded this newest development cautiously, but some of its provisions
were later incorporated into private agreements among other airlines.
F. The IA TA Intercarrier Agreements of 1996
Frustrated with the increasing complexity of the Warsaw System and
the continued low limits of liability, the International Air Transport
Association ("IATA") 75 drew up two private air carrier agreements in 1996.
Taking advantage of Article 22's opt-out clause, the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement on Passenger Liability ("IIA") required signatories to waive all
limits of liability, in favor of determining damages according to the law of
the injured passenger's domicile.76 The Agreement on Measures to
Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement ("MIA") implemented the
provisions of the IIA.77 In addition, the MIA allowed carriers to waive all
defenses on claimsup to 100,000 SDR (approximately $135,000)
regardless of negligence. Several carriers, including most major ones,
signed on to one or both of these agreements. As of June 30, 1999, 122
carriers are signatories to the IIA, while as of October 20, 1999, 90 are
signatories to the MIA.79
G. The Montreal Convention of 1999
The 1999 Montreal Convention represents the latest attempt to
consolidate the various treaties and private agreements that make up the
Warsaw System. 80 The Montreal Convention was completed in Montreal,
Canada, in May 1999, during an international air law conference. The new
Convention was immediately signed by over fifty countries, but will not
enter into force until it is ratified by thirty.81 Years of dissatisfaction with
the Warsaw Convention led the United States to take an active role in the
negotiation of the new agreement. The United States considers the
Montreal Convention a "success with respect to all key U.S. policy
74 Baden, supra note 2, at 455.
75 See supra note 65.
76 Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability [hereinafter "IIA"], available at
http://www.iata.org.
77 Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement [hereinafter
"MIA"], available at http://www.iata.org.
78 id.
79 Id.
80 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1.
81 See id. The Convention was transmitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent
on September 6, 2000. Id.
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objectives. 82 To fully appreciate the impact the new agreement will have
on international air travel, it is important to examine the relevant provisions
of the Montreal Convention and their effect.
1. Article 17: Baggage
Article 17(4) specifies that the term "baggage" means both checked
and unchecked (i.e., carry-on) baggage, and the Montreal Convention
applies equally to both.8 3 This provision would have changed the outcome
of one German case. The claimant sued the airline for his lost watch and
glasses after the flight crew took them and placed them in bags in the toilet
in preparation for an emergency landing. 84 The court ruled the items were
not "checked baggage" since no baggage ticket was issued. The carrier was
found liable for the loss, but at much lower liability limits than were in
place for checked baggage.85 In the U.S., on the other hand, a carrier was
held liable for all damages when it took a passenger's carry-on items
without issuing a receipt.8
2. Articles 19 and 20: Carrier Defenses
Article 19 replaces the "all necessary measures" defense8 7 with "took
all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage ...,88
Article 20 allows a carrier to avoid liability "to the extent that" the airline
proves the damage was caused by the passenger's contributory
negligence. 89 This is a slight modification of the Warsaw Convention'sArticle 21 contributory negligence defense.
3. Article 21: Two-Tiered Liability
Article 21 of the Montreal Convention calls for strict carrier liability
up to 100,000 SDR (approximately $135,000), with the only available
defense being contributory negligence.90 In claims for more than 100,000
SDR, the carrier may use the defense that the damage was not caused by its
negligence or wrongful act, or the accident occurred because of events out
82 id.
83 See id. at 89.
84 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 94-95 (citing 1979 ZLW 137 (Bundesgerichtshof, 28
Nov. 1978)).
85 Id.
86 See Schedlemayer v. Trans Int'l Airlines, 416 N.Y.S.2d 461 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
87 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
8 Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at 91.
89 See id. at 91.
90 See id. at 91-92.
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of the carrier's control. 9' This Article represents a drastic change in the
damages a plaintiff can receive, and increases the likelihood that passengers
will be adequately compensated for severe injuries or death from accidents.
Unless the carrier can show the plaintiff contributed to or caused the
accident, there is basically a guaranteed recovery of up to $135,000. After
that threshold, a plaintiff can theoretically recover an unlimited amount by
showing the accident was caused by the carrier's negligence. This is an
easier standard than having to show the carrier actually intended to cause
the accident. The result is that plaintiffs will finally be able to receive more
equitable and just compensation for their damages.
4. Article 23: Currency
Article 23 adopts the SDR valuation formula used in the Montreal
Protocols, basing the valuation on the date of judgment.92
5. Article 25: Opt-Out Provision
Article 25 allows a carrier to raise or eliminate the Convention's
liability limits. 93 This is a restatement of the "special contract" clause in
Article 17 of the original Warsaw Convention, allowing the carrier to
completely do away with the liability limits. However, Article 26 acts as a
"check" on that power by providing that any contract that relieves a carrier
of liability or attempts to lower the Convention's liability limits is null and
void.94
6. Article 30: Servant and Agent Liability
Article 30 explicitly extends the limitations and conditions of the
Montreal Convention to servants or agents of the carrier.95 The provisions
of the original Warsaw Convention were somewhat unclear as to whether or
not servants and agents were included. Under the prior regime, this
ambiguity led to inconsistent interpretations by domestic courts. For
example, France did not allow servants or agents to take advantage of the
carrier's liability limits, reasoning that agents could not be liable since they
were not contracting parties. 96 In addition, the Singapore Court of Appeal
declined to apply the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention to
servants or agents of a carrier, on the basis of a "plain and literal" reading
9' See id. at 92.
92 See id. at 95.
9' See id. at 99.
94 See id. at 99.
95 See id. at 101.
96 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 95.
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of the Convention.97 Japan and the U.S., on the other hand, extended the
limitations to the carrier's employees, as well as "whoever performs the
tasks the carrier was required to do .... 98
7. Article 33: Plaintiffs Available Fora
Article 33 adds a fifth forum to the list of those in which a plaintiff
may bring suit. Under the Montreal Convention, a claim for damages may
be brought in the country of the "principal and permanent residence" of the
passenger as long as the carrier also flies to and from that country and owns
or leases premises in that country.99 This Article is another that will
potentially lead to more equitable results for plaintiffs. It resolves the
difficulties many had in bringing suit in their home country, due to a flight
on a foreign carrier in a distant country. It will now be much easier for
passengers to file claims in their home countries, with friendlier courts and
more familiar procedures.
H. Article 55: Relationship With Other Warsaw
Convention Documents
Article 55 provides that the 1999 Montreal Convention prevails over
the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and other subsequent
revisions. 1°° However, it is important to note the Montreal Convention's
supremacy over previous agreements applies only to those countries that
actually ratify the new Convention. If a country declines to ratify the new
agreement, and continues to adhere to one of the older treaties, the Montreal
Convention will not apply to travel to and from that country. Thus, some
commentators argue that the result of the Montreal Convention will be
greater disunity and inconsistency among the liability regimes. 101
For example, if the United States ratifies the Montreal Convention,
while Country X continues to adhere to the Hague Protocol, 10 2 travel
between the two countries will continue to be governed by the original
Warsaw Convention. This is because a State that ratifies one of the later
versions of the Warsaw Convention automatically adheres to the original
Convention. 10 3 In addition, international flights under the Warsaw System
are governed by the most recent treaty ratified by both countries involved.
97 See Yusen Air & Sea Service v. Changi International Airport Services, 1999-4 SLR
135, at 45 (Singapore Ct. of App., 1999).
98 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 95.
99 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at 102-03.
'0o See id. at 114-15.
101 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 99-100.
102 Assuming the country is not a party to the 1966 Montreal Agreement (covering travel
to the U.S.) or the 1996 IATA Agreement.
103 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 12.
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The United States never ratified the Hague Protocol. Therefore, even
though the United States is now a signatory to the Montreal Convention,
flight between the U.S. and Country X must fall under the most recent
version that both countries signed. Since Country X automatically adheres
to the original Warsaw Convention by signing the Hague Protocol, and the
U.S. did not sign the Hague Protocol, the most recent Convention to which
both countries are parties is the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, despite the
higher liability limits available through the 1999 Montreal Convention, a
passenger on the flight in the above example would still be limited to $8300
recovery. The potential for confusing results such as these is precisely why
some fear that introducing this new document may only serve to complicate
the system even further.
II. REASONS FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY
A. Adherence to Different Conventions and Agreements
One of the primary reasons for the lack of uniformity in the rules
governing international air travel is the many protocols and amendments
mentioned previously. Member countries and private airlines adhere to
different provisions, depending on whether they have ratified the original
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, the Montreal Agreement, or one
of the numerous other protocols or private airline agreements.1°4 The U.S.
Second Circuit Court noted, "[a] single State might be bound to one version
of the Warsaw Convention with one State, another version of the Warsaw
Convention with another State, a separate bilateral treaty with another State,
and a separate contract with a private party."'' 0 5 Because of the many
different agreements in effect, passengers on the same flight are often
subject to vastly different liability schemes, depending on each individual's
destination, departure point, the home State's ratification of various treaties,
and the nation where suit is brought.1
0 6
For example, if a passenger flies from the U.S. (a Warsaw country) to
France (a Hague Protocol country that also adheres to the 1966 Montreal
Agreement governing flights to and from the U.S.), the courts of both
France and the U.S. would apply the Montreal Agreement's $75,000
limit. 10 7 If a passenger instead flies from Belgium (a Hague Protocol
country) to France (also a Hague country), the Belgian and French courts
would both be bound by the $16,600 limit on carrier liability specified in
104 See Rubin, supra note 5, at 210.
'0' Chubb & Son, 214 F.3d at 306.
106 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 100. Baden, supra note 2, at 439; See
Rubin, supra note 5, at 212.
107 Rubin, supra note 5, at 213.
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the Hague Protocol. 0 8 This means that if "Mary" flies from the U.S. to
France via Belgium (all Montreal Agreement countries'°9), while "Sally"
flies only the Belgium-France leg of the same flight, Mary could receive up
to $75,000 under the Montreal Agreement from a crash on the Belgium-
France portion of the trip, whereas Sally would only be allowed to recover
$16,600, as mandated by the Hague Protocol.
Similarly disparate recovery amounts could result from a plane crash
in which some passengers, by nature of their contract (i.e., ticket)" ° with
the airline, are considered international (and therefore limited by some
variation of the Warsaw Convention), while other passengers are
considered domestic, and therefore subject only to the local liability rules
instead of the Warsaw limitations."' For example, on a round trip flight
from New York City to Nice via Paris (i.e., New York - Paris - Nice - Paris
- New York)' 12, a passenger making the entire trip would be considered
international (and therefore subject to the Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Agreement), while a passenger flying only from Paris to Nice on
the same airplane would be considered domestic (and therefore not covered
by the Convention), no matter what the passenger's nationality.''
Depending on local law, the domestic passenger could potentially receive
much more than the international passenger for an accident on the same
aircraft, occurring at the same time, resulting in the same injuries.
In addition, punitive damages and claims for mental anguish are barred
for plaintiffs suing under the Convention, while such claims are available to
domestic plaintiffs. A domestic plaintiff who suffers from major
depression or other mental trauma as a result of the plane crash would be
able to recover for the anguish and associated costs, such as psychiatrist
bills. An international passenger, on the other hand, would be limited to
compensatory damages for physical injury caused by the accident only. All
expenses incurred as a result of an emotional or mental injury fall outside
the scope of the Convention, and the international plaintiff would not
recover anything for them. Results such as these have led the United States
to call for greater unification among the provisions of the Warsaw System.
108 Id.
109 See discussion supra Section II(C) and accompanying notes.
110 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 10-11 ("The ticket is what usually determines if the
transport is international or not .... "). Id. at 14. ("The rule that the destination is
determined by the intent of the parties as evidenced by the ticket has been adopted almost
universally... The actual intent is usually immaterial.").
... See id. at 15.
112 See id. at 13.
"1 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 100.
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B. Differing Linguistic Interpretations of Treaty Language
Many of the inconsistent rulings are the result of courts' interpretation
of various French words and legal terms in the original, official Warsaw
text. Article 1(1), for example, states the Convention "applies to all
international carriage of persons, luggage or goods.... ,,1a There appears
to be a difference in the definition of "goods" among various States.
France, in keeping with the official French text of the Convention, uses the
word "marchandises" rather than "goods."'" 5  "Under French law,
'marchandises' means anything able to be the object of a commercial
transaction, whereas 'goods' refers to any inanimate object and excludes
live animals." 16 The U.S. and Canada use the word "goods," yet have
extended the definition to include live animals." 7  One French court
determined that cadavers did not come under the scope of the Convention,
while courts in the U.S. have found otherwise." 18
The interpretation of the term "bodily injury" ("l1 sion corporelle") in
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention has led to much discussion as to how
far to apply the concept. The United States and the United Kingdom are
among the countries whose courts have held that bodily injury cannot be
construed as covering purely mental injuries." 9 The Supreme Court of
Israel, on the other hand, held that the Convention should be interpreted in
the context of modern society, in which damages for mental distress are
often awarded. 20  The Federal Court of Australia has taken a slightly
different approach. The Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol are
codified into Australia's domestic law. The court decided psychological
harm is not compensable on international flights under the Warsaw
Convention, but such injuries are compensable under the domestic version
of the Convention on flights within Australia.'
2
'
The interpretation of "willful misconduct" also differs among various
countries. The original French text of the Convention uses the word "dol,"
which implies an act that intentionally causes injury. 22  Common law
countries do not have that particular concept, so "willful misconduct" was
114 Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
"5 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 8.
116 id.
117 See id.
118 See id. (citing Djedraoui c. Tamisier, 1953 RFDA 494 (Trib. Paix Paris, 31 March
1952)).
119 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), Hammond v. Bristow
Helicopters Ltd., ScotCS 80 (Scottish Ct. of Session, 13 Nov. 1998).
120 See Daddon v. Air France (1985) 39 R.F.D.A. 232 (1 S&B Av.R, vii/141).
121 South Pacific Air Motive Pty. Ltd. v. Magnus, 157 ALR 443 (Fed. Ct. Austl., 1998).
122 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 121.
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chosen for the English translation.' 23 Because willful misconduct need not
be intentional, but instead may be a reckless act with knowledge that harm
will result, this translation effectively lowers the burden of proof in
common law countries. 124  Civil law countries tend to treat "gross
negligence" as the equivalent of "dor' (which, since 1957, has been
interpreted as "inexcusable fault" in France).125 Japanese courts interpret
"willful misconduct" as "gross negligence.,,1 26 "In common law countries
the courts have emphasized the specific character of 'wilful [sic]
misconduct,' which is entirely different from negligence and goes far
beyond it, however gross or culpable the negligence may have been.' 27
This conflict in interpreting the terms of Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention has led to the development of two different tests to determine
whether a carrier's behavior fits within the scope of the provision. The
objective test does not look at the actor's intent, but instead uses a
"reasonable person" standard. 28 This standard was used by the High Court
of Fiji in determining that a pilot who flew 100 feet above the ocean in
severe weather conditions, and later crashed, was not guilty of willful
misconduct, since it would be "perverse" for a person in that situation to
purposely act in that manner. 29 France, Germany, Greece and Korea have
also used the objective test when deciding cases involving willful
misconduct.'
30
The subjective test, on the other hand, looks to the actor's state of
mind at the time of the accident.13' A Hong Kong court declared that its
case law shows the subjective test should be used. 13 2 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the U.S. has also followed a subjective standard.' 3
This difference in standards can make it more difficult for plaintiffs in
subjective test jurisdictions to prove an air carrier's willful misconduct and
lift the Warsaw Convention's liability cap, since proving the pilot's actual
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 85.
126 See Wood, supra note 2, at 152.
127 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 85.
128 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 121.
129 Thomas v. Turtle Airways, Ltd., Civ. Action Nos. HBC 1024 & HBC 1025 of 1983
(High Ct. of Fiji at Suva, 1997), available at www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fiji cases/
volumeS-TlThomas_v_TurtleAirways.html.
130 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 121.
131 Id.
132 See Hang Seng Bank Ltd. v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., 1997 HKC Lexis 2018
(High Ct. of Hong Kong 1997).
133 See Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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intent is more burdensome than simply demonstrating what a "reasonable
person" would have done in the same situation.
34
In determining under Article 28 the forum in which suit may be
brought, 35 the French courts define "place of business" ("dtablissement")
as being "the center of operations of a corporation (geographically distinct
of its headquarters), but excluding its filials (subsidiaries or branches) and
agencies.'16  The U.S., Germany, and Switzerland, on the other hand,
define "place of business" much more broadly to include the carrier's
offices, as well as agents who merely sell tickets for the carrier.
137
However, a Canadian court found that an agent who only sells tickets in
return for a commission is not included under the definition of
"etablissement" for the purposes of jurisdiction under Article 28.138
In addition to the problems inherent in working from a foreign
language text, many courts struggle with the consequences of the
sometimes vague intended meanings of the Convention's terms. The
difficulty of the Convention's construction was recognized as early as 1949.
One commentator wrote that "almost every Article of the existing
Convention includes defects or obscurities, and some of them contain
several. These are not merely theoretical or technical defects.., they cause
almost daily practical difficulties and problems. .... 39
One issue that arises is whether the available fora listed under Article
28 refer to countries generally, or rather to specific places within a
particular country. The U.S., Switzerland, and England have decided the
fora listed under Article 28 refer to the entire territory of a nation, not to
particular "political subdivisions" (such as states) within the territory. 140
France and Nigeria, however, see the Article 28 jurisdictions as referring to
particular areas within a nation, rather than the entire nation itself.41 This
variation could affect a claimant's choice of court.
42
Differing interpretations of "embarking" have also been found in
various countries. France defines "embarking" as "the time the passenger is
134 See Baden, supra note 2, at 452.
135 Four fora are available: 1) the carrier's domicile, 2) the destination, 3) the carrier's
principal place of business, or 4) the place where the travel contract was made, if the carrier
also has a place of business there. See discussion supra Section II(A)(6).
136 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 145.
137 See id. at 146.
138 Id. at 147 (citing Quershi v. KLM, 102 Dom. L. Rep. 3rd 205 (Nova Scotia Sup. Ct. 12
June 1979)).
139 K.M. Beaumont, Need for Revision and Amplification of the Warsaw Convention, 16 J.
AIR LAW & COM 395, 411-12 (1949).
140 See GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 140-41.
141 See id. at 141.
142 See id.
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placed in a zone of air transportation risks,"' 14 3 while Germany holds the
carrier responsible once it has directed the passenger to go from the
terminal to the plane. 44 In the U.S., a carrier's responsibility begins once it
has "assumed some control over the passengers."' 4
C. Differing Domestic Interpretations of Treaty Provisions
Much of the lack of uniformity in the application of the rules in the
Warsaw System stems from the fact that a court's interpretation of the
scope of the provisions is usually based on local law, rather than any one
international standard. Several provisions of the Convention have received
disparate interpretations by domestic courts. Many countries, including
France, England and Australia, have adopted the Convention to cover
domestic as well as international air travel, ostensibly to increase
uniformity in the application of the rules. 146  However, since several
Articles of the Convention direct the courts to use local law for determining
such factors as who may bring suit and what damages are recoverable for
injury or delay, there is a lot of disparity in how various countries' courts
apply the Convention.147 It is well known that the outcome of a claim can
depend greatly on the court where it is filed. One commentator remarked
that "[i]t is possible for a claimant to influence legal procedure by his
choice of a forum."'
148
A court considering an Article 21 defense of contributory
negligence, 49 for example, must apply its own law to determine
contributory negligence and the amount by which it may reduce a carrier's
liability. 150 This has led to the application of different rules, sometimes
even within the same country. In the U.S., for example, some states will
not usually allow a claimant to recover unless he has proved there was no
contributory negligence at all, while other U.S. states will allow a claimant
to recover an amount that has been reduced by the extent to which he
contributed to the damage.' 51
141 Id. at 63.
'44 See id.
145 Id.
146 See id. at 5.
147 See, e.g., Article 21 (contributory negligence), Article 22 (amount of liability), and
Article 29 (period of limitations), Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
148 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 83.
149 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
15o See GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 91.
151 See id. It should be noted, however, that a court hearing a Warsaw case may not apply
its own law if that law is contrary to the rules of the Convention. See id. at 91. "To do so
would run contrary to the spirit of Article 23 which prohibits courts from reducing the
liability of the carrier under the Convention." Id.
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Another example of disparate local interpretations is found in
situations involving the delay of baggage by an airline. Article 19 of the
Warsaw Convention does not specify what damages are recoverable in case
of delay, leaving it up to each court to determine according to local law.
The recovery allowed for inconvenience or expenses associated with
delayed baggage varies widely. France will not allow a vacationer to
recover damages caused by delayed luggage. 152  In the United States,
however, a New York court allowed a plaintiff to recover damages for the
inconvenience and humiliation that resulted from baggage being delayed
for the entire duration of the vacation. 53 One German court allowed a
plaintiff to recover compensation for his replacement purchases but not lost
vacation time caused by the baggage delay.
The addition of local choice of law rules into the equation means
claimants of different nationalities may also receive disparate results in the
same forum. In France, for example, one court allowed a lawsuit for
damages on the death of a mistress, 55 whereas in many other countries,
only members of the decedent's immediate family or those persons
supported by him may file suit.' 56 Because choice of law rules are up to the
local court to determine, it is entirely possible a U.S. court would apply
French law to a French citizen's action for damages under the Warsaw
Convention, thereby allowing recovery for the death of a mistress. In an
action by a U.S. citizen for damages arising out of the same accident,
however, it is highly unlikely that the same court would allow the American
to recover for the death of a mistress.
Finally, domestic interpretation of the jurisdictions available under the
Convention often leads to inconsistent results. One U.S. court held it had
no jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention to hear a case involving the
crash of a Panamanian airplane, for which the decedent purchased a ticket
from Continental Airlines in Texas, in accordance with an interline
agreement between the two airlines (both of which are IATA members). 57
Another United States court declared that "whether tickets were paid for at
an agency in one location but issued by a different agency in another
152 Id. at 81 (citing Air France c. Malbois 1984 RFDA 287 (Cass., 27 March 1984)).
153 Kupferman v. Pak. Int'l Airlines, 438 N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
114 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 81 (citing 1986 ZLW 86 Amtsgericht DUsseldorf, 15 Oct.
1984)).
155 See id. at 177 (citing Mutelle d'Assurances Aeriennes c. Veuve Thierache, 1967
RFDA 443 (Cass. 18 July 1967)).
156 Id. See, e.g., Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l, 126 F.3d 1205 (9t Cir. 1997) (affirming
District Court's finding that a woman whose adult son was killed was not entitled to
wrongful death damages because she was not financially dependent on the decedent).
157 Luna v. Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A., 851 F.Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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location, the agency that actually issues the tickets will be deemed the place
through which the contract was made ....
Meanwhile, a Philippine court found it had jurisdiction under the
Warsaw Convention to hear a case in which the claimant, in Geneva,
exchanged a Singapore Airlines ticket to Copenhagen for a one-way ticket
to New York from American Airlines. 59 The court held that, due to the
fact both airlines are members of the IATA, the defendant airline was
acting as an agent of Singapore Airlines. Since the original ticket (the one
that was exchanged) was purchased in the Philippines, the court deemed the
replacement ticket to be part of a successive carriage, and therefore
Philippine courts had jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the Convention
(e.g., the place of business where the contract was made). 6°
D. Conversion of Liability Amounts into Local Currency
The methods countries use to convert the Warsaw Convention's
liability amounts into local currency can lead to different values. Under the
combination of regimes that currently exists, "[t]he local court can use 1)
the 'official' price of gold, 2) the free market price of gold, 3) SDRs, as
envisaged under the Guatemala and Montreal Protocols, or 4) the current
value of the French franc, or 5) some other currency."' 6' Some courts in
India, Austria, Greece, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Italy base
their conversions on the market price of gold. 162 The U.S. approach is to
base conversion values on the last official dollar value in gold (a "status
quo" solution used in Spain and Germany as well). 163 Many countries have
legislation that converts the Convention's amounts into their local
currencies (e.g., U.S., Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, New Zealand,
Norway, England, Netherlands, Canada, Italy, South Africa, Sweden). 164
Some of these statutes, however, base the conversion to domestic currency
on an "outmoded" gold standard, causing low liability limits as a result of
inflation.'
65
Another difference in countries' conversion to local currency comes
from the date used for the conversion. Several methods are used by
signatories to the Convention: 1) the date of the contract, 2) the date of the
accident, 3) the date of the judgment, and 4) the date of the payment.'66
158 Singh v. Tarom Romanian Air Transport, 88 F. Supp. 2d 62, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
159 See American Airlines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 116044-45 (3d Div., Philippines 2000).
'60 See id.
161 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 97.
162 See id. at 99.
163 See Wood, supra note 2, at 152.
'64 GOLDHIRSH, supra note 2, at 97-98.
165 See id. at 98.
166 See id. at 106.
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The original Convention allows all of the above methods, while the Hague
Protocol provides for the conversion to be made on the day of the judgment.
Meanwhile, French law dictates the conversion to take effect on the date of
the accident. 167  Therefore, depending on which agreement a country
adheres to, and what the local laws direct, the amount of damages awarded
could vary widely.
E. Differing Calculations of Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations is another way in which the application of
the Warsaw System's rules may differ among countries. The two-year
period for bringing suit under the Convention (specified in Article 29)168 is
viewed as a condition precedent to a suit (and therefore not subject to
tolling) in Israel, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain. 169 France and Austria,
on the other hand, consider the two-year period a statute of limitations that
is subject to tolling. 70 One U.S. court ruled the limitations period is not
subject to tolling, even when the defendant airline is under bankruptcy
protection. 17' This difference can affect the resolution of questions of when
an action is brought, and whether the time period can be suspended or
interrupted.1
72
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY
The uncertainty of the outcome of a lawsuit stemming from a plane
crash, particularly when some passengers are considered domestic while
others are considered international, has led to growing dissatisfaction over
the inconsistent liability limits placed on claimants who must bring suit
under the Convention.173  Because the liability limits in the Warsaw
Convention are so low compared with the amounts generally awarded in
167 See id. at 107.
168 Article 29 provides:
(1)The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2
years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the
law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 4.
169 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 154-56.
170 See id.
171 See Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 388, 10 (8th Cir.
1999).
172 See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 2, at 154-55.
173 See Wood, supra note 2, at 151.
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domestic air cases in the U.S., some U.S. courts have interpreted the
Convention in ways that produce outcomes less offensive to the American
tort system. 7 4 Japan is another example of a country where the wide
disparity between the Warsaw Convention's limits and domestic tort
awards prompted drastic change to the liability regime. Distressed and
embarrassed by the discrepancy, Japan did away with the Convention's
liability limits altogether through the Japanese Initiative. 75 In yet another
example, the Italian Constitutional Court ruled in 1985 that the low liability
limits in the Convention violated the right to compensation for personal
injury or death, and that the limits were therefore unconstitutional.'
Judges frequently express their disdain for the low amounts they are
forced to award. The High Court of Fiji was faced with a claim by two
passengers who were seriously injured when their plane crashed in the
ocean (a third passenger died). The plaintiffs were unable to show the
pilot's actions were reckless, however, so their recovery was limited by the
Warsaw Convention. In the decision, the court stated:
Given the most harrowing experience they had and the injuries they
described in evidence and the medical reports on those injuries, if these
actions fell to be decided on the ordinary principles of common law
negligence I would have no hesitation in awarding them damages for their
injuries and the loss of enjoyment of life these have entailed of a much
higher order than that suggested by counsel for the Defendant .... 177
The court also expressed regret that, under the Convention, it could not
award the plaintiffs interest on damages in the 14-year old accident.
1 78
Similarly, an American court stated it was "troubled by the seeming
inequities in the law resulting from the application of different standards for
recovery," but added that there was very little the court could do to resolve
the issue.
179
Ironically, the drive to achieve the uniformity sought by the Warsaw
Convention actually contributes to the lack of uniformity in the application
of its rules. Several courts have expressed the desire to use more discretion
174 See id.
175 See DIEDERIKS-VERSHOOR, supra note 19, at 98. See discussion infra at Section II(E)
and accompanying notes.
176 See Wood, supra note 2, at 151. This was later rectified by 1988 legislation which
raised the limits to 100,000 SDRs and required carriers to keep liability insurance. See id.
177 Thomas v. Turtle Airways, Ltd., Civ. Action Nos. HBC 1024 & HBC 1025 of 1983
(High Ct. of Fiji at Suva, 1997), available at www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/
paclawmat/Fiji-cases/volumeS-T/Thomas_v_TurtleAirways.html.
178 See id.
179 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 118 F.Supp.2d at 920. Both domestic and international
passengers were on the flight. Domestic passengers were free to pursue punitive damages
against the airline, an option denied to the international passengers because of the Warsaw
Convention. Id. at 921.
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in Warsaw cases."0 However, the fear of contravening the Convention's
goals leads courts to judge cases based on their interpretation of the original
1929 treaty. Courts also look to each other for guidance in their judgments.
Although this appears to be a logical formula for reaching uniformity
among nations, this is not always the result. Frequently, a court's attempt
to interpret a Warsaw provision in the context of the original Convention,
and a court's desire to interpret the provision in the context of modem local
law, are incompatible. While proclaiming that a decision was made in
accordance with the original Convention and other countries' judgments, all
in the name of uniformity, some of a court's natural inclination toward its
own law and sense of equity between domestic and international passengers
creeps into the opinion. Although this is hardly surprising, it serves to
create small but discernible differences between countries' application of
the Convention. These variations are significant enough that the uniformity
so cherished becomes merely an illusion.
This cycle causes some tension between courts. For example, the
Israel Supreme Court proposed that the goals of the Convention be
reevaluated to keep up with the realities of modem life, specifically in the
area of compensation for emotional distress, which is widely recognized as
a valid claim under domestic law.181 The Scottish Court of Sessions
considered this approach, but ultimately declined to follow it, in favor of
the United States' view that the Convention does not allow compensation
for purely mental injury. 8 2  The court did so somewhat reluctantly,
however, stating that "because of the need to achieve uniformity, it [is] not
permissible to construe the Convention in the light of the changes in civil
aviation transport since 1929 ....
The fact that courts apply the Convention differently, despite the quest
for uniformity, is not lost on plaintiffs. In one case, the plaintiffs brought
suit against an airline in both France and England simultaneously, as a way
of "hedging their bets" as to which court would grant them jurisdiction.
The British court noted the plaintiffs knew they could receive a higher
award in France, while the defendant airline hoped to take advantage of
England's stricter interpretation of the Warsaw Convention. 85 The court
1SO See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Little Rock, 118 F.Supp.2d at 920-21. See also Wood,
supra note 2, at 151.
181 See Daddon v. Air France, (1985) 39 RFDA 232 (1 S&B Av.R, vii/141).
182 See Hammond v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., ScotCS 80 (Scottish Ct. of Sessions, 13
Nov. 1998) (citing Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991)).
183 Id. (citing Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., 42 NSWLR 110 (S. Ct. New South
Wales, 1997)).
184 See Deaville v. Aeroflot Russian Int'l Airlines, 2 Llyod's Rep. 69 (Q.B. 1997).
185 See id.
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also stated that "[i]t is common ground that the French Courts interpret art.
25 [sic] more favourably to claimants than do the English Courts ....,186
The lack of uniformity in the application of the various liability
regimes within the Warsaw System leads to all of the problems mentioned
above. Passengers and airlines are left with great uncertainty as to which
treaty will govern any given accident. The multiple overlapping liability
schemes can lead to victims of the same accident recovering vastly different
amounts for the same injuries. Courts currently have little guidance in their
interpretation of treaty provisions, leading to even more unpredictability as
to how a case may be decided. All of these inconsistencies and
uncertainties leave claimants bewildered and confused, forcing them to
search desperately for a country in which they may have hope of receiving
an adequate and appropriate judgment.
IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE REVISED CONVENTION
The 1999 Montreal Convention provides both passengers and carriers
with a much higher degree of predictability than exists under the current
Warsaw System. The new Convention clarifies many terms and provisions
which were previously left to individual courts to decipher. For example,
the new Convention specifies that both checked and unchecked articles fall
under the definition of "baggage," thereby enabling passengers to recover
for damage to carry-on items. 187 The wording of the original Warsaw
Convention is frequently ambiguous, which has led some courts to
conclude that a passenger cannot recover for damage to belongings kept in
his possession while on board the plane. The new Convention enables
parties to have a better idea of how courts are likely to interpret certain
provisions.
The Montreal Convention also resolves the issue of whether a carrier's
servants and agents are covered by the liability limitations and other
provisions extended to the carrier. The new Convention states explicitly
that the rules are intended to include servants and agents of the carrier. 188
Prior to this determination, countries were divided as to whether a servant
or agent could take advantage of the Convention's liability limits and
defenses. By resolving these types of conflicts, the Montreal Convention
makes it easier for both passengers and carriers to know their rights and
obligations.
The "two-tiered" liability regime set forth in the Montreal Convention
will have a major impact on future litigation. The new agreement requires
carriers to assume strict liability for all claims up to 100,000 SDR
186 Id. at 70.
187 See Montreal Convention, supra note 1, at Article 17.
188 See id. at Article 30.
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($135,000).189 The only defense a carrier has against these claims is to
show contributory negligence on the part of the passenger. Plaintiffs will
no longer be denied compensation due to the carrier's showing that it took
"all necessary measures" to avoid the accident. The strict liability scheme
gives plaintiffs more certainty they will be fairly and adequately
compensated for their injuries.
The second tier of the Montreal Convention's liability scheme states
that, for claims over 100,000 SDR, a carrier can only avoid liability if it
shows the damage was not due to the negligence or wrongful act of the
airline. 90 Plaintiffs need not show that the carrier actually intended to
cause an accident, as required under the original Warsaw Convention.
Airlines are still protected against frivolous million-dollar judgments, since
the carrier can escape liability over 100,000 SDR if the accident was not
due to negligence. This liability structure will lead to greater uniformity injudgments among signatories to the Montreal Convention because
passengers are guaranteed compensation, while carriers are guaranteed
some protection. Again, both sides will be better able to determine the
damages which any given court will award.
It is important to point out, however, that this uniformity can only
happen when all countries involved in the various liability regimes are
members of the Montreal Convention. Otherwise, as noted previously, the
lower limits of the most recent agreement signed by both parties apply, and
the passengers and carriers are once again left wondering which rules
govern their claims.
The U.S. has not yet ratified the revised Convention. Some scholars
argue that a consolidated system will make matters even more confusing,
since countries are not required to agree to the newest revision. 9' As long
as countries have the option of adhering to one of the earlier Warsaw
agreements, the newest version will quickly become merely the latest to
complicate the system. However, if all signatories agree to not only ratify
the new treaty but denounce all of the other agreements, much of the
current tension within the Warsaw System will dissipate. If all countries
either belong to one unified treaty or none at all, both passengers and
airlines will have a greater chance of knowing what rules govern their
international flights, and how much they may recover in the event of an
accident.
The United States is involved in a large number of all international
flights. Accordingly, the U.S. has the clout necessary to persuade other
countries to follow its lead in this matter. In his introduction of the 1999
Montreal Convention to Congress, U.S. Senator Strobe Talbott stated that
189 See id. at Article 21.
'90 See id.
191 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 19, at 100-01. ("It would only confuse matters
further by adding another legal instrument to the existing series." Id. at 100.).
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"U.S. ratification of this Convention will encourage ratification by a
number of other States and will lead to a much-needed and long sought
after modernized unification of the liability regime applicable to
international air carriers." 192 The world's reaction to the U.S. denunciation
of the original Warsaw Convention in 1966, when the international
community drew up a special agreement designed specifically to placate the
U.S. and keep the country in the Warsaw System, is evidence of the United
States' position as a leader in the international aviation arena. The United
States should denounce all previous aviation treaties and private
agreements, and ratify the 1999 Montreal Convention. Most other countries
would likely follow suit. By agreeing to consolidate the entire Warsaw
System into a single document, the international community would take a
huge step toward finally achieving the Warsaw Convention's goals.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of commentators and courts agree that one of the main
goals of the original Warsaw Convention was to create uniformity in the
application of rules relating to international air travel, particularly in the
area of liability. Courts around the world strive for comity among States
when deciding Warsaw cases. Judges frequently consult foreign cases for
guidance in ensuring uniformity of application of the Warsaw provisions.
But despite these efforts, uniformity remains elusive. There are currently
too many documents being interpreted by too many different legal systems
for absolute uniformity to be achieved.
It is possible, however, that countries can reach a higher degree of
predictability than now exists in the application of rules governing
international aviation. For this to happen, all of the current signatories to
the various documents in the Warsaw System must sign the newest unifying
treaty, the 1999 Montreal Convention. In addition, the countries must
denounce all of the previous agreements, both public and private. This may
seem like a massive undertaking. But as long as countries still have the
option of adhering to any of the previous Warsaw documents, the newest
version will soon be just the latest in a long line of conflicting treaties in a
confusing regime. Only after the international community has consolidated
the Warsaw System into one official document, to the exclusion of all
others, will the original goal of uniformity become a reality.
192 Montreal Convention, supra note 1 (letter of submittal).
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